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Abstract
We examine empirically the role of lending relationships in determining the costs and
collateral requirements for external funds. The data originate from a recently concluded
survey of small and medium-sized German firms. In our descriptive analysis, we explore
the borrowing patterns and the concentration of borrowing from financial institutions.
Using data on L/C interest rates, collateral requirements, and the firm’s use of fast
payment discounts we find that relationship variables may have some bearing on the
price of external funds, but much more so on loan collateralization and availability.
Firms in financial distress face comparatively high L/C interest rates and reduced credit
availability. Ó 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: G21; D45
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1. Introduction
The relationships between firms and external financiers can be aected by a
number of problems. Due to incompleteness of contracts and the intertemporal
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structure of lending transactions, hold-up problems may arise. If the respective
partners cannot commit ex ante to non-opportunistic behavior, the investment
and funding decisions may not be fully ecient. Furthermore, in the presence
of asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard may lead in-
vestors to ration credit. 1
A growing literature addresses these problems and the extent to which they
may be reduced by implicit contracts. The relationships between banks and
enterprises have become particularly relevant in this discussion. Long-term
relationships between banks and firms may be an important instrument for
counteracting informational asymmetries, which are presumably characteristic
of financial markets and the likely cause of financing constraints. Developing a
reputation for non-opportunistic behavior in such a relationship may be im-
portant for solving commitment problems. Presumably, the above-mentioned
problems (and the need for solving them) are particularly pronounced for
smaller firms which face idiosyncratic risks and relatively high volatility in their
economic environment. 2 Prior studies, e.g. by Petersen and Rajan (1994) and
Berger and Udell (1995), have shown that the quality of bank–firm lending
relationships is an important determinant for financing conditions of SMEs in
the United States. To date, no comprehensive study of this kind has been
undertaken for German SMEs, although the German economy has been sin-
gled out by some observers as the archetypical case of a bank-based financial
system (Allen and Gale, 1995). Moreover, German banks have often been
praised as being particularly eective in channelling investment funds to SMEs.
One might therefore expect that the quality of lending relationships should be
of particular importance in this country.
In this paper, we present a study of lending relationships between banks and
SMEs in the German economy. Our contribution to the literature is twofold.
First, based on new survey data we provide large-sample descriptive evidence
on the nature of lending relationships for German SMEs, and in particular on
the concentration of borrowing and the degree of exclusivity in bank–firm
lending relationships. Such evidence has not been produced prior to this study,
1 The potential impact of credit rationing on the firm’s investment policy has been addressed in a
large number of empirical studies. See Schiantarelli (1995) for a survey and discussion. Some of
these studies have been criticized for using inconclusive tests. For a detailed critique see Kaplan and
Zingales (1997). Yet, even critics of these studies do not question that financing constraints are
likely to exist.
2 For a country like Germany it should be particularly important to analyze the financing of
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), since these firms account for a relatively large share of
employment and output. According to the 1987 Census of Establishments 78.6% of establishments
and 65.4% of all firms in the non-agricultural private sector had fewer than 500 employees.
Loveman and Sengenberger (1991) show that these shares are quite high in comparison to those in
UK and the US.
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and the issue has been controversial. 3 Second, we contribute a multivariate
analysis of the determinants of collateral requirements, L/C interest rates, and
the availability of external finance (measured by fast payment discounts taken).
Naturally, variables that are supposed to describe the quality of lending rela-
tionships are particularly important in this exercise. We employ a number of
such indicators: the duration of the lending relationship, the number of fi-
nancial institutions the firm is actually borrowing from, and a subjective re-
sponse in which firm managers indicate to which extent they consider their
bank relationship as being characterized by mutual trust.
Our descriptive evidence suggests a high degree of concentration in bor-
rowing. While the concentration of borrowing decreases strongly with firm size,
even the largest firms in our sample receive about two-thirds of the total credit
volume from one institution. A substantial fraction of firms even maintains
exclusive lending relationships: about 50% of all firms with fewer than 10
employees receive their external finance from one institution only. Further
descriptive results are provided below. In our multivariate specifications, we
find that the incidence of collateralization of the firm’s most important line of
credit decreases with the duration of the lending relationship and increases with
the number of institutions the firm is borrowing from. The result can be ob-
tained irrespective of the inclusion of the trust variable which is potentially
endogenous, but yields a negative and highly significant coecient in our
collateral equation. As to L/C interest rates, neither the duration variable nor
the number of lenders have any explanatory power for the cost of credit. The
coecient of the trust variable is again highly significant and negative, indi-
cating that the other two variables may not be sucient to characterize lending
relationships well. Firms which have been in financial distress during the past
five years face comparatively unfavorable financing conditions, both in terms
of collateral as well as interest rates. In essence, we find that firms with more
concentrated borrowing and long-lasting bank relationships fare better than
other enterprises in terms of collateral requirements, interest rates, and credit
availability. Other eects are discussed in detail below.
In the remainder of this paper, we start by discussing central theoretical and
conceptual issues in Section 2. We also discuss some of the existing empirical
evidence. In Section 3, we then briefly describe the data set used in our analysis.
3 See for example the discussion in Edwards and Fischer (1994). In a parallel work, Jan Pieter
Krahnen, Martin Weber and their associates have collected panel data from credit files of five large
German banks. See Elsas et al. (1997) for a description of their data which is uniquely suited to
study the dynamics of lending relationships between banks and firms. However, their sample
contains only a few firms with sales of less than DM 50 million (1996). Conversely, in our 1997
sample only 6% of the firms have sales of more than DM 50 million. Moreover, the data collected in
our project can be used to compute ‘‘representative’’ statistics for the overall SME sector in
Germany.
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The interested reader may consult the data appendix in which sampling and
interview procedures are described in more detail. Based on our theoretical
discussion and the data at hand, we then consider in turn the following em-
pirical issues:
· the patterns of borrowing and the extent of lending concentration in Ger-
man SMEs,
· the incidence of collateral requirements for bank lines of credit (L/Cs),
· the cost of external finance (measured by L/C interest rates),
· and the availability of external finance.
We comment on our results and on further research in the concluding section.
2. Theoretical foundations and prior empirical evidence
2.1. Theoretical issues
The interaction between borrowers and lenders has been considered in the
theoretical literature from a number of perspectives. Financial markets appear
to behave dierently from standard goods exchanges in that prices do not
necessarily adjust such as to allow for market-clearing. In business surveys,
firms frequently allude to the lack of equity and/or external finance as a major
impediment to enlarging their investment and innovation activities. Such sur-
vey responses may indicate the presence of rationing phenomena which can be
analyzed in a number of theoretical frameworks, e.g. as problems of moral
hazard and adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), of costly state-verifi-
cation (Gale and Hellwig, 1985; Mokerjee and Png, 1989), or in the context of
incomplete contracting (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). An important feature of
the literature is the result that collateralization may under some circumstances
be conducive to overcoming credit rationing problems (Bester, 1985). 4 Surveys
of these models and their implications have been presented by Bhattacharya
and Thakor (1993) and by Van Damme (1994). We restrict ourselves here to a
discussion of theoretical contributions which are most relevant for our study.
Many of the papers in this area can be traced back to some thought-pro-
voking ideas put forth by Mayer (1988). Mayer questions the conventional
view that unbridled competition among suppliers of finance will improve credit
availability as well as price conditions (i.e. interest rates), as one would expect
in standard commodity markets. In Mayer’s view, competitive banking mar-
kets may perform badly, since banks are barred from committing themselves to
the rescue or the funding of a firm’s long-term investment. The bank that
provides the lion share of the firm’s external finance and which maintains a
4 See Schmidt-Mohr (1997) for a discussion and generalization of some of the results.
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long-term, though not necessarily exclusive lending relationship is often re-
ferred to as a house bank. 5 It has been suggested that the house bank phe-
nomenon is particularly widespread in Germany, and this suggestion, though
controversial, has caught the attention of a number of researchers. We briefly
summarize a number of theoretical models that focus on the costs and benefits
of long-term lending relationships.
Based on Mayer (1988), Fischer (1990) describes two types of dynamic in-
consistency problems related to the formation of close lending relationships. If
a firm has to finance a long-term project from external sources, the project may
initially produce negative returns, but these are compensated by high positive
returns later on. Ex ante contracting over the full duration of the project may
not be feasible, and therefore some recontracting may take place during the
project’s duration. At this point, the firm may be vulnerable to opportunistic
behavior on part of the bank, e.g. if the latter demands higher interest rates for
the second period. The expectation of such opportunistic behavior could lead
the firm to abstain from undertaking the project altogether. Both the bank and
the firm would prefer if the bank could commit to non-opportunistic behavior.
A similar problem may emerge on the side of borrowers. Firms in financial
distress may be in need of a bank-led ‘‘rescue operation’’. But engaging in the
reorganization, the bank may incur losses in the short run, since the firm is not
capable of assuming a higher debt or interest burden. If the firm cannot
commit itself to a long-term lending relationship which would allow the bank
to compensate short-term losses in the long run, banks in competitive banking
system will not undertake the rescue. However, competition can be restricted if
bank and firm engage in a long-term relationship which gives the ‘house bank’
an informational advantage and thus some ex post monopoly power.
Greenbaum et al. (1989) and Sharpe (1990) provide similar models in
which long-term relationships between banks and firms may emerge endog-
enously. As in Fischer (1990), these models predict that the bank will develop
informational monopoly power over ‘high quality’ firms. Since banks earn
rents on these relationships and since competition drives overall profits to
zero in these models, the banks charge relatively low interest rates to bor-
rowers of unknown quality, but then exploit the emerging informational
5 It is dicult to give a precise definition of what constitutes a ‘house bank.’ Fischer (1990), pp.
3–4, argues that house banks can be characterized w.r.t. four features. First, they account for the
largest share of external finance. Moreover, they tend to provide the largest share of financial
services in general. Second, house banks entertain long-term relationships with their customers.
These relationships are characterized by considerable trust between the partners. Third, their role
as the dominant lender and the preferred access to information give house banks an influential role.
Fourth, house banks will play an important role when the firm faces a period of financial distress or
the need of restructuring.
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monopoly. 6 Thus, firms of high quality do not experience an improvement in
their financing conditions, since they cannot convey information about their
quality to other banks. Their low risk of default is therefore not reflected in
the interest rate and other non-price terms.
A contrasting view is provided by Petersen and Rajan (1995) and by Boot and
Thakor (1994). Petersen and Rajan (1995) demonstrate that banks may have an
incentive to charge high interest rates early on (reflecting the expectation that
some firms are ‘‘bad risks’’) and that financing conditions for those firms which
turn out to be ‘‘good risks’’ improve over time. Boot and Thakor (1994) model
an infinitely repeated game between lenders and borrowers. Collateralization
of loans is explicitly taken into account in their model. The qualitative predic-
tions are similar to those of the Petersen/Rajan model: firms will pay relatively
high interest early in the bank–firm relationships. Later, after providing proof
that investment projects have been concluded successfully, the lender will
pledge no collateral anymore and will also enjoy improved price conditions.
These theoretical models typically distinguish between firms (or investment
projects) in terms of their quality. The underlying quality is modelled as a time-
invariant characteristic. While cases of financial distress are not modelled ex-
plicitly, one is tempted to conclude that such events may lead the bank to
reevaluate the firm’s quality. Subsequently, credit conditions may deteriorate,
both in price and non-price terms.
2.2. Previous empirical results 7
The dichotomy of Germany and Japan as bank-dominated financial sys-
tems, and of the UK and the US as market-based systems has dominated
corporate finance folklore for some time. For the case of Germany, this view
has been challenged only quite recently by Corbett and Jenkinson (1994) who
show that Germany, the UK and the US do not dier with respect to the share
of finance coming from banks. But even if corporate finance in Germany may
not be particularly dependent on bank finance, Mayer’s hypothesis that Ger-
man banks are particularly eective in channelling long-term debt to firms in
the non-financial sector may still hold (Mayer, 1988).
While Fischer (1990) presents a theoretical model illuminating the advan-
tages of close lending relationships, he also provides some evidence that this
model may not provide a good depiction of contemporary banking practices in
6 Rajan (1992) developed a model where the firm anticipates the bank’s ex-post monopoly power
and therefore turns to market-provided debt finance. Market debt is not an option for the SMEs in
our sample, and therefore we do not discuss this issue in more detail here.
7 As in the theoretical discussion, we are discussing selected papers. More detailed summaries of
previous work can be found in Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995), Berger and Udell (1995) and
Fischer (1990).
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Germany. 8 Summarizing the results from 34 interviews with large banks and
firms, Fischer suggests that commitment mechanisms have only little impor-
tance for bank finance in Germany. He notes that competition appears to be
well at work in that market shares of individual banks are quite low, and that
due to competition, banks have little discretion over interest rates. Intertem-
poral compensation is thus made impossible. Moreover, he argues that firms in
good standing (‘high quality’ firms) tend to maintain multiple banking rela-
tionships, and that banks prefer to share risks with other banks. The arguments
collected by Edwards and Fischer (1994) extend this line of thought. Not only
is there little evidence of high banking concentration and exclusive firm–bank
relationships in Germany, but firms seeking such a relationship are even
characterized as the financially weaker and less profitable SMEs (see Edwards
and Fischer, 1994, p. 145). Edwards and Fischer also dispute that banks have
significant influence on the policies of these firms – either through supervisory
board seats or through proxy votes in shareholder meetings. It should be
emphasized, however, that most of the Edwards/Fischer study analyzes the role
of banks in the governance of large publicly traded enterprises. There is vir-
tually no evidence with respect to small and medium-sized firms. Thus, their
study in conjunction with the earlier results reported by Fischer (1990) leave
open whether there are segments of small and medium-sized firms in the
German economy for which close banking relationships have positive eects.
This is in essence one of the questions we seek to answer in this paper.
Two other papers studying firm–bank relationships in the US are of par-
ticular relevance to our analysis. Petersen and Rajan (1994) use data from a
detailed survey administered by the US Small Business Administration (SBA).
As a result of this data collection eort, they are able to analyze the financing
of about 3400 US enterprises with fewer than 500 employees. The survey data
include information on loan conditions (interest rates, maturity, collateral) and
on other sources of funds such as trade credit, equity finance, leasing contracts,
etc. Moreover, the data contain information on lending relationships, i.e. on
the duration of bank–firm relationships, the number of financial institutions a
firm is relying on, and the share of total bank funding coming from the par-
ticular lender. Petersen and Rajan (1994) analyze the data with respect to in-
terest rates and loan availability, using firm characteristics like size and age and
characteristics of lending relationships as exogenous regressors. To separate
groups of firms according to financing constraints, they use the extent of trade
credit as an indicator. Since trade credit is presumably the most expensive
external source of finance (Elliehausen and Wolken, 1993), this is a reasonable
proxy variable for a debt-constrained financial regime in small companies.
8 For earlier studies on collateralization of bank loans and bank behavior during financial
distress see Drukarcyk et al. (1985) and Hesselmann and Stefan (1990).
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They find that the extent of trade credit usage is negatively related to the age of
the enterprise and the duration of existing lending relationships.
Berger and Udell (1995), using the same dataset as Petersen and Rajan
(1994), concentrate on collateral requirements and interest rates for lines of
credit (L/Cs). These authors argue that a study of L/Cs should be particularly
revealing, since relationships are more likely to matter in this context than for
mortgages or other types of loans. They also note that the interest rate re-
gressions in Petersen and Rajan (1994) combine various types of loans in one
equation, and that focussing on one particular type of loan may yield cleaner
results. Berger and Udell find that firms with longer lending relationships have
to pledge collateral less frequently, and that interest on L/Cs decreases as a
function of duration. Thus, contrary to the results reported by Petersen and
Rajan (1994), the duration of a lending relationship may after all have some
impact on credit price terms.
Taken together, these studies provide fairly strong support that the quality
of lending relationships improves the availability of bank loans and – in the
case of L/C interest rates in the US as studied by Berger and Udell – also aect
price conditions significantly. Moreover, it seems that enhanced competition
between financial institutions (as measured by the number of institutions the
firm borrows from) will lead to a reduction in the availability of loans. How-
ever, note that this result is not supported by the interview data described in
Edwards and Fischer (1994) for the case of the German banking system. Note
finally that the empirical studies at hand appear to agree on the role of firm age
and firm size. Relatively small firms and relatively young firms may have
greater diculties in obtaining funds than their larger and older counterparts. 9
One would expect that this finding should not vary across countries, while the
incidence and impact of long-term lending relationships need not be similar.
After all, the institutional setups of the respective financial sectors are quite
dierent. A study of lending relationships in the country where these have been
assumed to play a major role should therefore be a worthwhile endeavor.
3. Hypotheses and empirical analysis
3.1. Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical arguments and previous empirical evidence, we
summarize here our central hypotheses.
9 Harho (1998) finds in a sample of medium-sized and large firms that liquidity eects are
present only in the lower tercile of the size distribution. Subjective responses from survey data
support that conclusion. Winker (1996) also provides evidence that smaller firms are more aected
by lack of equity and debt finance than larger firms.
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· H1. As the lending relationship continues, price and non-price credit condi-
tions will not improve or even deteriorate due to the emergence of an infor-
mational monopoly.
· H2. Firms with long-lasting lending relationships and/or concentrated bor-
rowing patterns will incur lower costs of capital, and/or will have better ac-
cess to external finance, including lower collateral requirements.
These hypotheses summarize the contradictory predictions from the models
described above. H1 is consistent with the work of Fischer (1990), Sharpe
(1990), and Greenbaum et al. (1989). H2 summarizes the predictions from the
Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Boot and Thakor (1994) models, which obvi-
ously contradict hypothesis H1. We complement these competing hypotheses
with a less controversial one on the relationship between firm age, firm size and
cost and availability of credit. Firm size eects are likely to reflect the bar-
gaining power of larger borrowers, while age eects should be present if the
average quality of firms improves with age due to selection eects. Hence:
· H3. Availability of capital will increase with firm size and age, while the cost
of capital and the incidence of collateralization will decrease in these vari-
ables.
In our empirical tests of these hypotheses, we combine elements of the two
most extensive analyses on lending relationships in the US, i.e. the study by
Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995). We follow the example
of the latter study by concentrating on collateral requirements and interest
rates for lines of credit, while we also employ trade credit data as in Petersen/
Rajan in order to assess the impact of lending relationships on credit avail-
ability. The data and variables at hand are described in the following two
subsections before we turn to the descriptive and the multivariate analysis.
3.2. Data
A detailed description of the data used in this study is presented in Appendix
A. The database covers non-subsidiary firms from all major sectors of the
German economy with no more than 500 employees.
There are a number of reasons for the exclusion of subsidiary firms, i.e. of
enterprises in which other firms held 50% or more of the shares. As pointed out
in Harho et al. (1998), liability of subsidiaries in the case of insolvency is
typically passed on to the parent company. Indeed, prior interviews with banks
suggest that banks almost always insist on a guarantee by the parent (Pa-
tronatserklarung). The relatively low insolvency rate of subsidiaries is therefore
not surprising – the preferred type of exit of these firms is a voluntary liqui-
dation. The characteristics of the subsidiary firm may therefore carry no
information about its creditworthiness. Moreover, the firm whose charac-
teristics do matter for the subsidiary’s creditworthiness is likely to be relatively
large.
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As to industrial coverage, our sample deliberately encompasses firms from
all sectors of the economy. We chose to include firms from the service,
transportation and trade sectors since these account for a growing share of the
economy. Moreover, some sectors in these industries may be subject to a lack
of collateral precisely because production is less capital-intensive than in
manufacturing.
The industrial composition of our sample is described in Table 1. The ma-
jority of firms (44.5%) are in the manufacturing sector, but services, trans-
portation and trade also account for 40.6%. The remaining 209 firms (14.9% of
the sample) operate in the construction sector. The main characterizing vari-
ables for our firms are size (measured as average number of employees in 1996)
and age (1997 minus the year in which the firm was ocially registered at the
Handelsregister, or if no entry in the Handelsregister was necessary, 1997 minus
the start-up year taken from our survey). 10 Since age and size distributions
tend to be heavily skewed, the mean values of the sample are not particularly
informative and the information on medians is more relevant. As one would
expect given our sampling design the firms are quite small with median em-
ployment of 10 employees. The median age of all firms is 11 years, but firms in
construction and services are on average considerably younger than manu-
facturing firms. Again this is an expected result, given that firm turnover in
these sectors is particularly high (see Harho et al., 1998).
3.3. Endogenous and explanatory variables
Before turning to our descriptive and multivariate results, we briefly discuss
the endogenous and explanatory variables used in the specifications described
below. These are summarized in Table 2. To test our hypotheses, we employ
three dierent multivariate specifications. First, we model the incidence of
collateral requirements for the firm’s most important line of credit. The de-
pendent variable is set to one if some form of collateral or guarantee was re-
quired to obtain the L/C. The second specification is a model of the interest
rate on the most important L/C. The reference day is 1 January 1997. Credit
availability is not observable directly, and we follow the strategy employed by
Petersen and Rajan (1994) who use the share of fast payment discounts actually
taken as an indirect measure. Details of this measure are discussed below.
We have assigned the explanatory variables to four groups. Data on ob-
servable firm characteristics are used to reduce the impact of heterogeneity of
10 We truncate the age distribution at 8 years for East German firms. The same rule applies to the
duration of the relationships between the firm and its lending institutions. Our rationale for doing
so is that banks will not base their evaluation of the firm’s creditworthiness on information that was
produced prior to the 1989 breakdown of the socialist East German regime.
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firms in our sample. In particular, we use the logarithm of age and size, indi-
cator variables describing whether the firm experienced financial distress, legal
form dummy variables, employment growth, dummy variables indicating a
change in legalblTj
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3.4. Patterns of borrowing and lending concentration
Table 4 summarizes the concentration of borrowing by firm age and size for
the 1127 firms in our sample of 1399 firms which actually borrowed from fi-
nancial institutions. Total borrowing of German SMEs typically comprised
borrowing from financial institutions and borrowing from shareholders and/or
family members or friends. In order to come up with a simple questionnaire
item, the question upon which Table 4 is based asks for the share of borrowing
from the most important five institutions.
Considering Panel A of Table 4, it is evident that borrowing by small firms is
considerably more concentrated than borrowing by larger firms. For the group
of firms with fewer than five employees, 80.1% of external funding come on
average from one institution, while firms with 250–500 employees borrow only
61.7% from the most important institution on average. The mean and median
number of borrowing relationships increase with firm size. The share of funds
borrowed from the five largest lenders taken together increases with firm size,
reflecting the fact that borrowing from shareholders, family members and
friends becomes less important as firms get larger. Panel B shows that similar
results can be obtained with respect to firm age. Younger firms generally dis-
play more concentrated borrowing patterns than more seasoned firms. The
number of dierent borrowing relationships increases considerably with firm
age, but less strongly than with firm size.
Naturally, the simplest explanation of these patterns is one of fixed costs for
maintaining a borrowing relationship. But besides dierences on the cost side,
the benefits of multiple banking relationships may also be size-contingent.
Assuming that lenders prefer concentrated lending relationships in order to
obtain informational advantages and that less concentrated borrowing struc-
tures may require a risk premium, small firms may not have the bargaining
power to prevent a deterioration of credit conditions once they decide to use
less concentrated borrowing patterns.
One may ask whether firms that employ concentrated borrowing structures
dier in terms of observable characteristics from firms borrowing from a larger
number of institutions. We attempt to provide a tentative answer in Table 5
which summarizes the mean values of important indicators for groups of firms
with one, two or more than two lenders. We also report the p-value of simple
ANOVA models which test for significant dierences of the means across the
three groups. Speaking in broad terms, there is no convincing evidence that
firms with less concentrated borrowing (i.e. with a relatively large number of
lenders) appear superior in terms of their indicator variables. If anything, the
converse is the case. Equity ratio, return on sales and the trade credit variables
suggest that firms with fewer lenders may be superior, ceteris paribus, although
the relationship is often not significant. Nonetheless, there is no support for the
Edwards/Fischer suggestion that it is mainly financially weak firms which want
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to maintain exclusive or highly concentrated relationships with financial in-
stitutions.
3.5. Collateral requirements
In order to reduce credit risk, a bank may demand collateral or some form
of guarantee from the lender. Collateral may also help to classify risk groups
more precisely (Bester, 1985). Availability of credit may be seriously restricted
by the degree to which the firm can present assets to the bank which are ac-
ceptable as collateral. Collateral requirements and interest rates may be de-
termined in a complex bargaining process on which we have virtually no data.
To simplify the analysis, we will assume that collateral and interest rate con-
ditions are determined in a sequential procedure, with the collateral decision
preceding the determination of interest rates. A simultaneous setting of both
parameters would be interesting, but it is not clear at this point what the ex-
clusion restrictions in the system of simultaneous equations would be.
As our dependent variable for this analysis we define a binary dummy
variable indicating whether any form of collateral or guarantee was necessary
to obtain the line of credit. We do not distinguish here between dierent forms
of collateral and/or guarantees while Berger and Udell (1995) present a study in
which various types of collateral are included among the right-hand side
Table 5
Firm characteristics and lending relationships
Variables Means of variables by number
of lenders
F-test p-value
> 2 2 1
Equity ratio 0.201 0.199 0.230 2.14 0.119
(181) (169) (316)
Return on sales 0.032 0.037 0.038 0.94 0.392
(200) (206) (269)
Continuous innovation activities 0.581 0.587 0.512 3.69 0.025
(322) (346) (459)
Financial distress 0.304 0.306 0.285 4.21 0.015
(322) (346) (459)
% trade credits paid late 15.21 11.65 11.01 5.95 0.003
(259) (246) (326)
% trade credits with cash 60.95 63.38 63.50 1.65 0.192
discounts taken (241) (225) (288)
Firm size (employees) 67.95 34.06 22.70 23.24 0.000
(322) (346) (459)
Firm age 20.00 16.69 14.43 4.83 0.008
(322) (346) (459)
Note: Borrowing firms only. Number of observations in parentheses. The F-statistic tests the
equality of the mean values.
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variables in a probit equation. 14 However, their results do not indicate that
taking these variables into account aects conclusions in a major way.
We model the probability that the firm’s most important line of credit had to
be collateralized as a function of credit line volume, firm characteristics,
variables describing the lending relationship, various owner and management
characteristics, and control variables for the firm’s geographic location and
industry. Extending the specification used by Berger and Udell, we include the
volume of the line of credit as an independent variable. The eect of lending
relationships is captured in three variables: the duration of the lending rela-
tionship, the total number of institutions from which the firm borrows, and a
dummy variable indicating whether the respondent at the firm characterizes the
bank–firm relationship as one of mutual trust.
Based on the various theoretical rationales, our general expectations re-
garding the signs of the probit coecients are as follows. First, ceteris paribus
the bank will be more inclined to demand collateral as the volume of the line of
credit increases. It is equally plausible to us that larger firms with greater
bargaining power will be relatively more successful than smaller firms in
evading these collateral demands. Firm age, as an indicator of the firm’s ob-
servable reputation, is also likely to be negatively correlated with collateral
requirements. The distress variable ought to carry positive coecients since
banks are likely to step up collateral demands in the face of a financial crisis.
As to the relationship variables, we follow Berger and Udell in hypothesizing
that an increase in the duration of the lending relationship will lower collateral
requirements. We also assume that mutual trust between firm and bank will yield
the same eect. Conversely, if the number of lenders is relatively high, then any
lender (and be it the most important one) will be confronted with a less trans-
parent situation regarding its access to the firm’s non-collateralized assets in the
case of bankruptcy. Hence, collateral requirements should increase. We also
expect that firms in East Germany face a more stringent collateral regime than
their West German counterparts. This dierence is likely to reflect the com-
paratively high risk of bankruptcy in the East German regions which still suer
from relatively high unemployment and – by 1997 – comparatively slow growth.
The results from our probit specifications are summarized in Table 6. We
introduce the exogenous variables in groups in order to observe how the cor-
relation between some of them aects the results. Starting with a model that
does not include relationship variables in column (1), we find the following
pattern: the propensity of banks to (successfully) demand collateral increases
with the volume of the credit line, but it decreases with firm age and firm size.
14 As Berger and Udell note, these variables may be endogenously determined with the right-
hand side binary variable. While we have access to detailed information on types of collateral, we
have not used them yet in our analysis.
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The distress indicator has considerable explanatory power. Firms that were in
financial distress at some point during the five years prior to the survey are
considerably more likely (by 15% at the sample mean) to pledge collateral for
their L/Cs. Moreover, demanding collateral appears to be considerably more
common in the construction and trade industries, and in East Germany. The
management and owner characteristics are largely insignificant, as are most of
the firm characteristics. 15
In columns (2) and (3), we also include the relationship variables among the
regressors. In column (2) we exclude the trust variable, while it is included in
column (3). In the latter specification, all of the relationship variables turn out
to be significant: the logarithm of the duration of the lending relationship, the
number of dierent institutions the firm borrows from (number of lenders), and
the dummy variable indicating whether the respondent perceives the relation-
ship between bank and firm to be characterized by mutual trust. The coecient
signs are consistent with our expectations. Longer-lasting lending relationships
profit from reduced collateral requirements. Firms which engage in more
lending relationships face more severe collateral requirements. The trust vari-
able also carries the expected negative sign. Since ln(duration) and ln(age) are
highly correlated (q  0:692), it is not too surprising that the coecient of the
age variable drops from )0.146 (0.063) in column (1) to )0.076 (0.071) in
column (3). Not surprisingly, the joint test of significance for both variables
delivers a relatively strong result (v2  10:25; p < 0:01) in column (3). How-
ever, greater explanatory power in the collateral equation seems to lie with the
duration of the lending relationship rather than the firm’s age. Exclusion of the
trust variable has virtually no eect on the coecients in column (3). The trust
variable appears to capture information that is orthogonal, i.e. not contained
in the other explanatory variables. While we do not have information on what
determines the evolution of trust in bank–firm relationships, it seems clear that
there is more to it than simply time passing by (i.e., duration) or the extent of
competition (number of lenders).
One possible criticism regarding these specifications is the lack of balance
sheet indicators which may – in principle – be observable to the bank. How-
ever, one should point out that German SMEs are typically less forthcoming
with such information than (for example) small US firms. This is also reflected
in the fact that we obtain data on interest rates and financing conditions more
easily in our survey data than balance sheet information. In column (4), we use
two balance sheet indicators as explanatory variables. Since we do not have full
access to all of these at this point, the number of observations drops drastically
by about 50% (from 994 to 465 observations) and the standard errors in the
15 The dummy variable for family-owned enterprises and for firms in the legal form of KG, OHG
or BGB are significant at the 10% level, but we do not discuss their impact here.
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regression increase. The inclusion of the balance sheet variables aects most
drastically the coecients of the credit volume variable and firm size, although
they remain jointly significant at the 2% level. The relationship variables that
were significant in column (3) maintain their size, but their standard error
increases by a factor of about 1.5 (which is roughly what one expects if the
sample is reduced by slightly more than 50%). The joint test on the two balance
sheet variables is far from producing a significant test statistic, while the
variables which proved significant in column (3) mostly remain significant at
the 1% level. 16 We conclude that the lack of precision in this specification is
due to the reduction in the number of observations, and not due to the in-
clusion of balance sheet indicators.
In specifications not reported here, we also included interaction terms be-
tween the distress variable and all relationship variables. The joint test of
significance for the interaction terms would be a direct test of the hypothesis by
Fischer (1990) that firms with close lending relationships should fare better in
times of distress. However, the test statistic is not significant at any accepted
level (v23  0:33. Thus, there is no evidence here that the house bank model
according to Fischer (1990) has any explanatory power. Lending relationships
matter for collateral requirements – but they do not appear to be particularly
relevant in times of distress. Since this extension does not lead to further in-
sights, we maintain the results in column (3) as our preferred specification.
3.6. Line of credit interest rates
We now turn to the question of the cost of credit to firms. Again, we con-
centrate on lines of credit, since this type of credit should be more revealing
than, say, mortgages (see Berger and Udell, 1995). In Fig. 1, we plot kernel
density estimates of the distribution of 1997 interest rates on lines of credit for
three subgroups in our sample: established West German firms (older than 10
years), young West German firms (up to 10 years of age), and East German
firms. The latter two subsamples are roughly comparable in terms of their age
and size distributions. The estimated density functions are striking: first, there
is considerable variation of interest rates within each of the groups, and second,
the dierences between the samples are rather large. East German firms (which
are almost by definition young and relatively small) face considerably higher
interest rates than their young West German counterparts. The group of es-
tablished firms faces the most favorable conditions. 17
16 The balance sheet variables become partly significant if we drop the financial distress variable,
but they are statistically irrelevant once the distress dummy is included.
17 These non-parametric distributions have a drawback at this point, since we do not take the
sampling weights into account. However, the multivariate analysis below shows that the East–West
dierences are not just a consequence of dierences in the observable determinants of interest rates.
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The results of an OLS regression of interest rates on various sets of ex-
planatory variables are contained in Table 7. Interest on L/Cs is typically on a
fixed-term basis in Germany, but price conditions may be renegotiated within
relatively short time periods (such as three months). The German survey asked
firms for their L/C interest rates as of 1 January 1997. By concentrating on a
single reference point, we avoid potentially dicult issues such as correction
for underlying prime rates etc. Hence, we take as our dependent variable the
interest rate itself while Berger and Udell (1995) and Petersen and Rajan (1994)
either consider the dierence between interest and the prime rate or include the
prime rate and terms of the L/C among the right-hand side variables.
Again, we proceed sequentially in order to observe how coecients react to
the inclusion of further determinants. Note that the sample is slightly smaller
than in the collateral requirement specification, since some firms were reluctant
to give information about the interest rates they face. For the sake of brevity,
we turn immediately to column (3) where all relationship characteristics have
been included. The dominant firm characteristic determining interest rates
appears to be the firm’s size with a coecient of )0.40 (standard error 0.061).
Financial distress is again a significant determinant of credit conditions: firms
which have encountered a financial crisis face interest rates that are on average
0.36 percentage points above those of other firms. The most notable oset in
interest rates applies to East German firms. Ceteris paribus, their interest rates
are about 0.92 percentage points higher than comparable West German firms.
Another interesting eect becomes apparent in the city dummy variable. Firms
in city counties will on average face higher interest rates, although banking
competition is likely to be higher in densely populated cities than in fringe or
rural counties. This result may be consistent with US patterns described in
Fig. 1.
D. Harho, T. Korting / Journal of Banking & Finance 22 (1998) 1317–1353 1341
T
a
b
le
7
C
o
st
s
o
f
ex
te
rn
a
l
fi
n
a
n
ce
(l
in
e
o
f
cr
ed
it
in
te
re
st
ra
te
s)
–
O
L
S
re
g
re
ss
io
n
co
e
ci
en
ts
(s
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
C
o
ll
a
te
ra
l
)
0
.1
6
6
(0
.1
4
2
)
)
0
.1
6
4
(0
.1
4
3
)
)
0
.1
8
4
(0
.1
4
2
)
)
0
.2
3
6
(0
.2
1
5
)
ln
(a
g
e)
)
0
.1
9
1
(0
.0
9
9
)
)
0
.2
1
0
(0
.1
1
1
)
)
0
.2
0
3
(0
.1
1
1
)
)
0
.0
5
8
(0
.1
6
7
)
ln
(e
m
p
lo
y
ee
s)
)
0
.4
3
1
(0
.0
5
8
)

)
0
.4
3
3
(0
.0
6
1
)

)
0
.4
0
0
(0
.0
6
1
)

)
0
.4
1
4
(0
.0
8
6
)

F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
d
is
tr
es
s
0
.4
1
5
(0
.1
5
1
)

0
.4
2
5
(0
.1
5
4
)

0
.3
6
2
(0
.1
5
4
)

0
.4
6
5
(0
.2
1
0
)

L
eg
a
l
fo
rm

G
m
b
H
o
r
A
G
)
0
.1
6
3
(0
.1
6
7
)
)
0
.1
6
2
(0
.1
6
8
)
)
0
.1
6
4
(0
.1
6
7
)
)
0
.2
9
4
(0
.2
3
4
)
L
eg
a
l
fo
rm

K
G
,
O
H
G
o
r
B
G
B
)
0
.1
5
2
(0
.3
1
7
)
)
0
.1
5
5
(0
.3
1
8
)
)
0
.0
8
8
(0
.3
1
6
)
0
.1
9
3
(0
.4
5
8
)
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
g
ro
w
th
1
9
9
5
/9
6
0
.6
4
9
(0
.3
5
4
)
0
.6
6
9
(0
.3
5
9
)
0
.6
9
2
(0
.3
5
6
)
0
.5
0
9
(0
.5
2
2
)
R
ec
en
t
ch
a
n
g
e
o
f
le
g
a
l
fo
rm
0
.1
6
6
(0
.2
0
5
)
0
.1
6
1
(0
.2
0
7
)
0
.1
4
7
(0
.2
0
5
)
0
.1
4
2
(0
.2
8
0
)
R
ec
en
t
ch
a
n
g
e
o
f
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
)
0
.2
6
1
(0
.1
8
8
)
)
0
.2
5
5
(0
.1
8
9
)
)
0
.2
5
2
(0
.1
8
8
)
)
0
.2
3
9
(0
.2
6
0
)
P
ro
fi
ts
/i
n
te
re
st
0
.0
0
1
(0
.0
0
5
)
D
eb
t/
a
ss
et
s
0
.0
7
0
(0
.2
9
2
)
ln
(d
u
ra
ti
o
n
)
0
.0
3
9
(0
.1
0
1
)
0
.0
5
2
(0
.1
0
1
)
0
.0
7
1
(0
.1
4
3
)
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
le
n
d
er
s
)
0
.0
0
2
(0
.0
6
3
)
0
.0
0
1
(0
.1
6
2
)
0
.0
6
7
(0
.0
8
4
)
M
u
tu
a
l
tr
u
st
)
0
.4
8
1
(0
.1
4
0
)

)
0
.3
2
4
(0
.1
8
9
)
F
a
m
il
y
-o
w
n
ed
en
te
rp
ri
se
)
0
.2
3
3
(0
.1
4
8
)
)
0
.2
3
6
(0
.1
4
8
)
)
0
.2
3
5
(0
.1
4
7
)
)
0
.2
6
5
(0
.2
0
2
)
F
o
re
ig
n
o
w
n
er
)
0
.5
2
0
(0
.4
1
8
)
)
0
.5
1
2
(0
.4
1
9
)
)
0
.4
6
2
(0
.4
1
6
)
)
0
.4
7
5
(0
.5
7
9
)
O
w
n
er
-m
a
n
a
g
ed
fi
rm
0
.0
1
8
(0
.1
8
6
)
0
.0
1
4
(0
.1
8
7
)
)
0
.0
2
1
(0
.1
8
6
)
0
.0
2
5
(0
.2
5
4
)
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
to
p
m
a
n
a
g
er
s
)
0
.0
8
2
(0
.0
7
2
)
)
0
.0
8
2
(0
.0
7
2
)
)
0
.0
9
6
(0
.0
7
1
)
)
0
.1
0
2
(0
.0
9
1
)
E
a
st
G
er
m
a
n
fi
rm
0
.9
4
8
(0
.1
9
5
)

0
.9
6
6
(0
.2
0
0
)

0
.9
2
1
(0
.1
9
9
)

1
.0
0
6
(0
.2
7
2
)

F
ir
m
in
ci
ty
co
u
n
ty
0
.3
9
9
(0
.1
7
6
)

0
.3
9
7
(0
.1
9
7
)

0
.3
6
1
(0
.1
7
6
)

0
.4
1
1
(0
.2
4
6
)
F
ir
m
in
fr
in
g
e
co
u
n
ty
0
.1
7
1
(0
.1
6
7
)
0
.1
6
8
(0
.1
6
7
)
0
.1
6
9
(0
.1
6
6
)
0
.4
6
4
(0
.2
4
7
)
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
in
d
u
st
ry
0
.4
0
8
(0
.1
9
7
)

0
.4
1
0
(0
.1
9
8
)

0
.3
9
1
(0
.1
9
6
)

0
.9
0
7
(0
.2
7
7
)

T
ra
d
e
in
d
u
st
ry
)
0
.0
1
1
(0
.1
8
9
)
)
0
.0
1
3
(0
.1
9
0
)
0
.0
0
6
(0
.1
8
8
)
0
.0
6
5
(0
.2
6
9
)
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
in
d
u
st
ry
0
.8
0
8
(0
.2
5
0
)

0
.8
0
9
(0
.2
5
1
)

0
.8
7
9
(0
.2
5
1
)

1
.3
6
5
(0
.3
5
3
)

S
er
v
ic
e
in
d
u
st
ry
0
.4
4
0
(0
.2
1
2
)

0
.4
4
2
(0
.2
1
3
)

0
.4
7
2
(0
.2
1
2
)

)
0
.6
3
3
(0
.2
8
5
)

1342 D. Harho, T. Korting / Journal of Banking & Finance 22 (1998) 1317–1353
F
-T
es
t
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
ln
(a
g
e)
,
ln
(e
m
p
lo
y
ee
s)
3
7
.1
7
(2
,7
3
1
)

3
0
.3
9
(2
,7
2
9
)

2
5
.9
2
(2
,7
2
8
)

1
2
.3
2
(2
,3
6
5
)

F
ir
m
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
1
4
.0
4
(8
,7
3
1
)

1
1
.9
8
(8
,7
2
9
)

1
0
.0
7
(8
,7
2
8
)

6
.0
6
(8
,3
6
5
)

B
a
la
n
ce
sh
ee
t
–
–
–
0
.0
6
(2
,3
6
5
)
R
el
a
ti
o
n
sh
ip
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
–
0
.0
8
(2
,7
2
9
)
3
.9
9
(3
,7
2
8
)

1
.2
7
(3
,3
6
5
)
M
a
n
a
g
em
en
t/
o
w
n
er
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
1
.3
0
(4
,7
3
1
)
1
.3
0
(4
,7
2
9
)
1
.3
8
(4
,7
2
8
)
0
.9
0
(4
,3
6
5
)
C
o
n
tr
o
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
7
.0
7
(7
,7
3
1
)

6
.9
2
(7
,7
2
9
)

6
.6
7
(7
,7
2
8
)

6
.3
5
(7
,3
6
5
)

ln
(a
g
e)
,
ln
(d
u
ra
ti
o
n
)
–
1
.9
1
(2
,7
2
9
)
1
.7
5
(2
,7
2
8
)
0
.1
4
(2
,3
6
5
)
A
d
j.
R
2
0
.2
6
6
2
0
.2
6
4
3
0
.2
7
5
1
0
.2
7
9
9
N
7
5
2
7
5
2
7
5
2
3
9
1
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
:
li
n
e
o
f
cr
ed
it
in
te
re
st
ra
te
.
N
o
te
:
 ,

,

:
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
a
n
d
1
%
le
v
el
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
.
D. Harho, T. Korting / Journal of Banking & Finance 22 (1998) 1317–1353 1343
Petersen and Rajan (1995). They develop an explicit measure of bank con-
centration and find that in more concentrated markets, the availability of ex-
ternal finance increases.
Relative to the base category of manufacturing firms, firms in construction,
transportation and services are required to pay relatively high interest rates.
These dierences may reflect underlying dierentials in insolvency rates or
diverging opportunities for pledging collateral. Somewhat surprisingly and
contrary to the evidence in Petersen/Rajan, fast-growing firms (in terms of
employment growth) face higher interest rates than those with more modest
revenue growth. Taken at face value, this result may suggest that surging de-
mand for capital will lead to an increase in the price of debt. Interestingly, this
result may be consistent with the conclusion by Winker (1996) that fast-
growing German firms are more likely to encounter financing constraints.
One can see that firm age appears to have a significant negative eect on
interest rates while the duration variable turns out to be insignificant. We find
it remarkable that the coecient estimate we obtain for the age variable in this
regression ()0.203 with standard error 0.111) is virtually identical to the esti-
mate Petersen and Rajan (1994) present (Table IV, column (2): )0.227 with
standard error 0.078). As in their study, price conditions for L/Cs in Germany
are apparently not aected by the duration of the lending relationship. Thus,
our results are not consistent with the estimates generated by Berger and Udell
(1995) which should – in principle – be comparable since the dependent vari-
able is in both cases the L/C interest rate. Contrary to the Petersen/Rajan re-
sults, however, we find no evidence in this specification that the number of
lenders aects interest rates. 18 In the respective US results, the number of
banks from which the firm borrows has a strong positive eect on interest rates.
An additional source of external finance raises interest rates by about 31 basis
points in the Petersen/Rajan study, while there is no such eect in Germany.
The only relationship variable that turns out to be highly significant is the
indicator of trust which carries the expected sign and accounts for a 0.48
percentage point reduction in interest. Again, one is tempted to ask whether the
trust variable masks the eects of other relationship variables, since it is likely
to be itself a function of the concentration of borrowing and the duration of
the relationship. However, dropping this variable in column (2) does not lead
to any major changes of the results. Thus, price conditions for lines of credit in
Germany are apparently not aected by the duration of the lending relation-
ship or by the number of institutions from which the firm borrows. Trust be-
tween the borrowing and the lending organization may nonetheless contribute
to a significant reduction of the costs of external finance. The finding that the
18 This explanatory variable is not used in the Berger/Udell study. In our study, including the
Herfindahl index of borrowing concentration did not yield significant results, either.
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duration of the bank–firm relationship does not aect L/C interest rates is not
inconsistent with our first hypothesis (H1). As the bank learns more about a
particular firm, interest rate conditions should improve at least for high-quality
firms. We do not observe such an eect, but this result may be due to imperfect
measures of the firm’s quality.
The introduction of balance sheet indicators in this regression in column (4)
mostly aects the coecients of the trust variable and of the age variable. But
as in the collateral equation, the balance sheet indicators taken jointly are far
from reaching any conventional confidence level (F 2; 365  0:06; p > 0:1).
Neither does the inclusion of relationship variables interacted with the distress
dummy variable yield significant results (not reported in Table 4). The test
statistic (degrees of freedom) for the joint test of these variables is
F 3; 725  0:33 (p > 0:1. Given these results, we maintain column 3 as our
preferred specification.
3.7. The availability of external finance
We follow Petersen and Rajan (1994) by using a measure of trade credit
usage in order to infer the availability of external finance. 19 The use of the
indicators follows the logic that financing constraints should be indirectly
observable when a firm makes use of a particularly expensive form of credit, i.e.
at interest rates far in excess of ‘‘normal’’ rates charged by banks. In Table 8,
we use fast payment discounts taken as a share of fast payment discounts of-
fered to the firm as our dependent variable. The penalty for not taking fast
payment discounts is relatively high and given by the implicit interest rate of
fast payment discount rules: in Germany a 2% fast payment discount is typi-
cally granted if payment is made within two weeks, but there may be consid-
erable dierences across industries.
Turning directly to the preferred specification in column (3), we find that
firm age aects credit availability significantly while the duration of the lending
relationship is not a relevant regressor. Firms in financial distress tend to take
fast payment discounts considerably less often than financially sound firms.
With the exception of the number of lenders which exerts a negative impact on
credit availability, none of the remaining variables in the first panel of Table 8
turn out to be significant. However, we obtain a highly significant negative
eect for East German firms, indicating that these firms are less likely than
19 Petersen and Rajan (1994) actually use two indicators: the share of trade credit paid late and
fast payment discounts actually taken as a share of fast payment discounts oered to the firm. We
only use the latter variable, since it is more appealing to us in purely theoretical terms. Foregoing
fast payment discounts carries a relatively precise price (the discount), while paying trade credit late
will usually trigger a deterioration of trade credit conditions which is much harder to assess in cost
terms.
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comparable West German enterprises to take fast payment discounts. More-
over, firms in city counties are less likely than firms in sparsely populated rural
counties to take fast payment discounts. The balance sheet variables are again
insignificant when the distress dummy variable is included in the regression.
The results from this regression are less satisfactory than those presented
before. We see relatively low measures of fit (i.e., the pseudo-R-squared values)
which may be due to noisy measurement. Despite this caveat, however, the
results regarding the number of lenders, the firm’s age and the control variables
for firms in East Germany and in city counties are statistically significant and
logically consistent with our previous estimates. In particular, these results
indicate that firms with fewer lenders have to forego fast payment discounts
less often than otherwise comparable firms with a more dispersed borrowing
structure. Increasing exclusivity of borrowing appears to have a favorable
impact on the availability of debt capital.
4. Conclusions and further research
With this paper, we have attempted to explore the nature of firm–bank
relationships in Germany and their impact on the collateral requirements, cost,
and availability of external finance for small and medium-sized enterprises.
Towards this objective, we have employed a rich new dataset which has been
collected for the purpose of this analysis. We find that in the SME segment of
the German economy, lending is typically heavily concentrated on one or two
financing institutions. Many firms (in particular smaller enterprises) maintain
exclusive lending relationships, and typically one financial institution con-
tributes at least two-thirds of the overall loan volume.
We find that loan volume increases the propensity of banks to demand
collateral while firm size has a dampening eect. If the firm has been in fi-
nancial distress prior to our base year 1997, the likelihood of collateral re-
quirements increases sharply. The duration of the lending relationship is a
significant regressor in its own right, and the number of financial institutions
from which the firm borrows has a positive impact on collateral requirements.
If respondents indicate that there is mutual trust between bank and firm,
collateral requirements are significantly lower, but this relationship could be
spurious due to simultaneity problems. However, our estimation results are
virtually unchanged if we exclude this variable.
As to the cost of external finance (measured by the L/C interest rate), we find
the expected dependence of interest rates on the size of the firm and the firm’s
age, but none on the duration of the lending relationship. Moreover, financial
distress appears to lead to a considerable increase in interest rates of about 0.36
percentage points. Controlling for observable dierences between firms, we find
that East German firms pay about one percentage point more in L/C interest
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rates. This may reflect the risk premium charged by banks in the depressed East
German economy. Firms in city counties have to pay interest rates that are
about 0.4 percentage points higher than firms in fringe and rural counties. This
result appears to be consistent with estimates presented by Petersen and Rajan
(1995) who argue that reduced competition among lenders will tend to increase
the availability of debt finance. Mutual trust between bank and firm (as per-
ceived by our respondents in the firms) appears to have a strong beneficial
eect on interest rates and accounts for a dierential of 0.48 percentage points.
In our test of credit availability we use the percentage of fast payment
discounts actually taken as our endogenous variable. We find the expected
positive age eect, a negative impact of financial distress, and a negative impact
of the number of lending institutions. East German firms appear to be more
finance-constrained than West German ones. Moreover, we find that firms in
city counties are more likely to be constrained than firms in fringe and rural
counties. This result is consistent with the positive interest dierential for city
county firms which became evident in the L/C interest equation. 20
Taken together, these results suggest that long-lasting lending relationships
and concentrated borrowing are desirable to firms. The data are not consistent
with the Edwards/Fisher hypothesis that weaker firms seek to establish par-
ticularly close relationships, albeit at some cost. Ceteris paribus, firms with
more concentrated borrowing and long-lasting bank relationships fare better
than other enterprises in terms of collateral requirements, interest rates, and
credit availability. The exact interpretation of the lending relationship variables
is not trivial: these appear to aect collateral requirements and the availability
of credit more strongly than its price. Some of these variables (e.g. the number
of institutions from which the firm is borrowing) may be a function of the
firm’s financial status or quality. Thus, ‘good’ firms may tend to have long-
term relationships with relatively few institutions, while bad ones have to en-
gage in multiple relationships, since banks may not want to shoulder the risk of
these engagements alone. We will attempt to sort out these rival hypotheses in
further studies.
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Appendix A
The data used in this paper originate from a recently concluded survey of
1509 German small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The survey was
motivated by the fact that detailed information on financing patterns of Ger-
man SMEs is very scarce. Given that we sought relatively comprehensive data,
a mailed survey was ruled out. Instead, we decided to conduct a relatively
detailed person-to-person interview, employing the help of a large professional
surveying institute. The interviews took place between July and October 1997.
The construction of the sampling frame was based on data records obtained
from Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit-rating agency.
A.1. Questionnaire design
The design of the questionnaire is very similar to the one used by the US
Small Business Administration to conduct the National Survey of Small
Business Finances. 21 The German questionnaire consists of a screening
questionnaire and a main questionnaire. The screening questions seek to ensure
that only independent 22 private profit-seeking enterprises with no more than
500 employees (on average in 1996) are actually interviewed.
In the first part of the main questionnaire, the interviewers collect general
information about firm characteristics. These include location of headquarter,
number of employees, industry classification, and legal form. Furthermore, this
21 For details on this survey, see Petersen and Rajan (1994) pp. 6–7 and the references cited
therein. We obtained the questionnaire from the S.B.A. and adopted a number of particularly
relevant questions to the German context. We have attempted to keep questions comparable in
order to allow for future US–German comparisons at the firm level. The questionnaire is available
on request from the authors.
22 A firm is taken to be independent if no more than 50% of the shares are held by another
company.
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part of the questionnaire includes a section on socio-demographic information
about the firm’s managers and owners.
The second part collects information about the firm’s investment and in-
novation activities. The section referring to innovation activities is divided in
two blocks taking into account the dierences in innovation activities between
non-service and service firms. Both the investment activities section and the
innovation activities section contain a thought experiment which seeks to
distinguish firms that are debt-rationed from those which are not.
The third part of the questionnaire sheds some light on the firm’s rela-
tionships to financial institutions and its financing patterns. The first section
contains only questions concerning the firm’s experience with state subsidies,
followed by questions dealing with trade credit (Section 2) and qualitative
questions about relationships to financial institutions (Sections 3–5). Section 5
begins with questions about the number of dierent financial relationships, the
fractions borrowed from the five most important institutions and finally fo-
cuses on relationship characteristics concerning the most important financing
institution. We then seek information in Sections 6–8 on the firm’s experience
with credit applications, on sources of external funding, and detailed infor-
mation about the most important loans. These sections also yield information
whether a change in the firm’s financial relationships has occurred within the
last five years and why it has occurred. The detailed credit information in
Section 7 contains questions on borrowing conditions such as interest rate,
loan volume, maturity, and collateralization. The questionnaire closes with a
section collecting data from the last balance sheet and profit and loss accounts.
A.2. Sample design
As mentioned in the Introduction, we expected a high degree of reluctance
to take part in an interview. In order to allow for an ex post evaluation of
selectivity eects, it was therefore important to have available quantitative
information on non-respondents. Therefore, all of the addresses were basically
taken from the database of Creditreform, Germany’ largest credit-rating firm.
Prior to sampling, we excluded the following firms from the databases em-
ploying the VVC information:
firms having no usable address,
firms which have ceased to exist or had declared bankruptcy,
dependent firms, i.e. firms belonging to more than 50% to other firms or or-
ganizations,
firms in the legal form ‘‘Freie Berufe’’ (independent professionals), ‘‘Ar-
beitsgemeinschaft’’ or ‘‘eingetragene Genossenschaft’’ (co-operative) and
‘‘eingetragener Verein’’ (association),
firms with more than 500 employees,
firms not belonging to the following industries (two-digit WZ93 code): 15,
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16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,
37, 45, 50, 51, 52, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 72, 73, 74.
Additionally, we excluded the following East German firms:
firms founded prior to the fall of the Iron Curtain,
firms belonging partly or totally to the ‘‘Treuhandgesellschaft’’ (the holding
company set up to privatize former East German cooperatives),
firms belonging totally or partly to West German or foreign parent firms.
In the case of young West German firms, we omitted records with more than
250 employees, since these will in all likelihood not originate from independent
start-up firms.
After these exclusions, we produced a random sample stratified by industry
and firm size in three steps. First, a dataset of 143 firms in the area of Munich
was created for pretest purposes. This pretest was conducted for 15 firms in
order to improve the questionnaire design. Second, a dataset of established
West German firms was drawn, which finally included addresses from 5051
firms. A third sample of young West German firms (founded after 1989) con-
sisted of 1920 observations. Finally, a fourth sample of East German firms
contained 2585 addresses. A total of 9699 addresses was transferred to the
survey institute. Not all of the addresses were actually used in the process of
contacting firms. In 4366 cases, the target individual of the study (the
Geschaftsfuhrer or Prokurist in charge of financial aairs of the firm) was
actually reached via telephone. We consider this group the relevant gross
sample. In 1181 of these cases, the individuals contacted did not grant an in-
terview, since they considered the time requirement (60–90 min) as too severe.
In 1497 cases, they pointed to the topic of our survey as the main reason for not
complying with our interview request. 165 candidates gave other reasons for
not participating in the study, and 14 interviews actually took place, but did not
produce usable information. Thus, 1509 interviews were actually conducted.
When this article was being written inconsistencies in 110 questionnaires
required us to restrict the sample to 1399 observations.
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